Response to the Kerslake Report

Purpose of report

For discussion.

Summary

This report updates members on the progress made by the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) to ensure that the recommendations made in the Kerslake report have been shared with the sector. It also highlights a number of areas where members may seek to assure themselves that their own fire and rescue services have made adequate preparations in respect of a similar event.

Although Government is keeping an overview of the Kerslake recommendations, they have decided not to adopt them as national recommendations and want relevant emergency service personnel to respond. Many of the recommendations are multi-agency and are being monitored by the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) team. Specific Fire and Rescue related recommendations are being reported through NFCC Operations Committee.

Recommendation

Members to consider and comment on the implementation of the recommendations of the Kerslake Report.

Action

Officers to work with NFCC to ensure any comments from members are reflected in the work around the Kerslake report going forward.

Contact officer: Roy Wilsher

Position: NFCC Chair

Response to Kerslake Report

Background

1. On 27 March 2018 the independent report into the emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack – ‘The Kerslake Report’ – was published.
2. At the 22 June 2018 meeting of the Fire Services Management Committee a discussion took place, led by Roy Wilsher, which detailed how the NFCC intended to manage the recommendations made within the report.
3. Since then a significant amount of work has been undertaken, some of which remains ongoing, to ensure that the learning identified by the inquiry is translated into the necessary amendments to doctrine, both multi-agency and within the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS), and that all fire and rescue services are made aware of the learning.
4. This multi-agency doctrine, which is extensively referenced in the Kerslake report, is known as the ‘Joint Operating Principles – Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack v4’.

Review and update of extant guidance

1. The multi-agency doctrine, previously developed solely to manage a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack (MTFA), is undergoing a significant rewrite in direct response to the Manchester Arena attack and the recommendations made by Lord Kerslake, and also the London terror attacks of 2017. It is clear that none of these attacks were of the methodology described as MTFA, yet all responses used, to a large extent, the MTFA doctrine as a framework.
2. The rewrite recognises the experience and learning gained as a consequence of the different attack methodologies used within the UK, and provides guidance to responders in respect of command and control of such incidents, and some high level tactical considerations. The rewrite has been led by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism and has included representation from all relevant agencies including the NFCC. The revised guidance will be exercised during November 2018 with a view to publishing in December 2018.
3. Fire and Rescue Service guidance is written so as to facilitate the multi-agency response. As such it cannot be published until the multi-agency guidance is agreed, approved by Ministers, and published. That said, the fact that NFCC officers have been intimately involved in the rewrite, means that a ‘shadow’ single service guidance (the ‘Concept of Operations’) has been developed that can be published as soon as possible after the multi-agency document is released.
4. The levels of protective security which are required in developing this guidance does mean that any consultation process has to be kept to a relatively discreet group, and as such a significant piece of communication to the wider emergency services sector will follow the publication of both pieces of guidance.
5. The FRS MTFA National Working Group (NWG) have been involved in the development of the guidance, and it is widely welcomed as a progressive piece of work that will support FRS response in mass casualty terrorist attacks. The NWG have monitored the progress against the Kerslake recommendations and will provide a final assurance report to the January 2019 meeting of the NFCC Operations Coordinating Committee (OCC).
6. The assurance report to NFCC OCC will close the action plan instigated as a consequence of receiving the Kerslake report. The action plan captured those recommendations with a direct relevance to the FRS and promoted a consideration of how best to deal with them. In the main this has been achieved by changes to guidance.
7. Whilst, at the time of producing this update, approximately 4 weeks of the rewrite and approvals process remains, it is envisaged that the doctrine rewrite will encompass all recommendations that are relevant to the FRS. To complement this, a submission will also be provided to the FRS National Operational Guidance – National Operational Learning process. An information note will then be circulated to all FRS to ensure that they are aware of the revised guidance and that due consideration has been given to the recommendations made by Lord Kerslake.
8. Subsequent to this the Home Office Crime, Policing and Fire Group will work with NFCC and other multi-agency partners to develop a tri-service assurance process in respect of the national doctrine for response to mass casualty terrorist attacks. It has been jointly agreed that work will not commence on this assurance process until the new guidance is published and all services have had an opportunity to embed it into ways of working.
9. It will also be necessary to further consider how the National Operational Guidance Programme addresses mass casualty terrorist attacks, and preliminary discussions have taken place in respect of this. The consequences of attacks usually result in a scenario such as Road Traffic Collision, a first aid trauma event, a potential hazardous materials incident etc. that responders are well versed in, and for which guidance is already developed in respect of ‘regular’ incidents. Further consideration is required as to how best provide guidance on the context in which such scenarios occur when acts of terrorism are involved.

**Members Assurance**

1. At the time of writing this report it is planned that the multi-agency guidance will be published on 17 December 2018, though there are a number of external factors which may impact upon this. The rewrite has been driven by an incredibly tight timeline given the amount of work required.
2. The FRS Concept of Operations should, therefore, follow early in 2019.
3. A tri-service assurance process will be developed, and reported upon, during 2019. This process should give robust assurance to members as to how prepared fire and rescue services are for such incidents in the context of a tri-service local response, and how they would source and receive assistance from other FRSs if required.
4. In the meantime, and following publication of the guidance referred to in due course, members may seek to ensure that Fire and Rescue Services have:
	1. Received the revised Joint Operating Principles for a Mass Casualty Terrorist Attack and have embedded the guidance into ways of working;
	2. Received the revised FRS Concept of Operations for a Mass Casualty attack. Those services who host an MTFA Specialist Response Team will have a stronger focus on this document, though all FRS should be aware;
	3. Fully understood the support available to them through the FRS National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) in respect of any incident of this nature. It is likely that the vast majority of FRS would require some mutual aid or support when managing such an incident;
	4. A process in place to receive, and act upon, National Operational Learning Action Notes. All FRS should have an identified individual to act as a Single Point of Contact; and
	5. Considered, and acted upon, the recommendations made by the Kerslake Report in a local joint service environment – in most cases this would be the Local Resilience Forum.
5. Members may also seek to work with officers to identify suitable opportunities to be either be briefed on the local response model or to see a practical exercise being undertaken.

Implications for Wales

1. There are no specific implications for Wales.

Financial Implications

1. Although there are financial implications to the impacts of Kerslake report for the Fire and Rescue sector, there are no specific financial implications for the LGA from the content of this report.

Next steps

1. For officers to work with the NFCC to ensure any comments from members are reflected in the work around the Kerslake report going forward.